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David Cameron is applying lessons from his party’s history
in the Conservatives’ ‘Euro War’
This week sees the annual Conservative Party Conference, the lead up to which has been
characterised by strong language from leader and UK Prime Minister David Cameron on the
UK’s relationship with the EU. Françoise Boucek argues that Cameron’s management of
dissent within his party, by seeking compromise and appeasing opponents, is based on
lessons learned from the Conservatives internal rows over Europe during the 1980 and
1990s.
Europe has long been a problem f or Britain’s Conservatives. David Cameron has learned
the lessons of  his predecessors and hopes his
diplomatic skills will keep the peace in his party, in
his coalit ion government and in a changing Europe
until at least the 2015 general election. Cameron’s
recent rhetoric on Europe ref lects growing
Conservative unease over Europe prompted by
rising popularity f or the UK Independence Party
(UKIP), strains in the coalit ion government and
policy headaches f rom renewed EU drives f or
supranational governance.
Going into the Conservatives’ 2012 annual
conf erence, the talk has been about EU budget
f reezes, Brit ish opt-outs and opt- ins, a potential
ref erendum on EU membership and a review of  the
balance of  EU competences. It ’s all reminiscent of
the Thatcher-Major f actional wars over Europe
analysed in my f orthcoming book Factional Politics:
How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize (Palgrave).
Last July, Foreign Secretary William Hague launched the Review of  the Balance of  Competences in the
EU described by J. Clive Matthews on this blog as ‘a waste of  t ime’ due to the impossibility of  conducting
a proper costs/benef its analysis. I attended the audit’s init ial workshop a week bef ore the Conservative
conf erence and it looked like this consultation exercise aims to def use Conservative dissent while
kicking the European issue into the long grass.
This workshop didn’t instil much f aith in the government’s commitment to the exercise and had all the
hallmarks of  an internal conversation. Participants were almost all EU stakeholders f rom the public
sector including representatives f rom EU member state embassies in London, consumer and
environmental groups, a handf ul of  academics and one or two f rom business organisations. Phillip Souta
f rom Business for New Europe joined the f our-member panel at the last minute. It certainly didn’t f eel like
the launch of  a constructive Europe-wide debate about ref orming the EU to enhance its democratic
legit imacy and reconnect with its cit izens as touted in the FCO’s Command Paper. Indeed, the FCO
panellist lef t early and gave evasive answers about the audit’s structure, reporting methods and
measurements.
Eurosceptic Conservatives have been buoyed with the promise of  more ‘veto moments’ f rom Cameron
like last December when he threatened to block a f iscal pact to stabilise the eurozone. In reality, though,
it wasn’t a veto opportunity since no new EU-wide treaty was required and the UK isn’t a member of  the
eurozone anyway. Still, it  allowed Cameron to toss a scrap of  red meat to Conservative dissidents and a
largely eurosceptic populace and to exaggerate his capacity f or saying ‘no’. Af ter all, he had just suf f ered
a record post-war legislative rebellion when more than half  his caucus supported a motion calling f or a
ref erendum on the UK’s EU membership. Cameron’s use of  a heavy-handed three- line whip over a non-
binding vote was an unnecessary reminder of  Conservative divisions in John Major ’s years.
These days, the capacity f or any EU national government to veto EU policy is limited by treaty changes
and EU enlargement. It ’s also more dif f icult to mobilise support and build alliances in an EU of  27 member
states than just the nine or 12 f rom Western Europe during the Thatcher-Major years. Moreover, the
opportunit ies f or the UK to strike special deals in the European Council, like the 1984 budget rebate, or
the 1992 opt-out of  the euro, have just about gone.
Cameron’s management of  intra-party dissent is complicated by the constraints of  coalit ion government,
where he has to strike a delicate balance with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats led by Nick Clegg, a f ormer
MEP. The current audit of  the EU’s existing competences was part of  the coalit ion government
programme agreed in 2010.
Cameron knows only too well the problems Europe causes f or Brit ish Conservatives and told them
himself  upon becoming leader in 2005 that they had to ‘stop banging on about Europe’. In the 1980s,
Thatcher polarised party opinion with her strident anti-Europe views and made enemies of  f ormer
Chancellors of  the Exchequer Geof f rey Howe and Nigel Lawson, her once neo- liberal comrades in the
battle of  ideas.
Thatcher ’s successor John Major headed a deeply divided party during the tricky negotiations of  the
Maastricht Treaty creating monetary union. Against the odds, he won a f ourth consecutive victory f or the
Conservatives in 1992 but with a reduced majority of  21 seats. This increased the leverage of
eurosceptic MPs who demanded an EU ref erendum and their support was crit ical to the government’s
survival as by-election def eats piled up. Major ref used to compromise and threats of  EU deadlocks and
votes of  conf idence in the government f ailed to discipline the rebels who were eventually disowned but
later readmitted. This mistrust and disunity contributed greatly to the Conservatives’ crushing loss to
Tony Blair ’s Labour in 1997.
Cameron thinks he’s learned f rom his predecessors and is comf ortable striking compromises and
appeasing opponents. Like Blair, he is adept at ref raming divisive issues to def use them. He recently
stated that he doesn’t think it is in Britain’s interest to leave the EU but quickly added that Brit ish voters
would have to give ‘f resh consent’ f or any change in the UK’s relationship with the EU. He is also
changing the context by f ocusing on the EU’s 2014-2020 budget negotiations and pushing f or a f reeze
in EU spending in coalit ion with natural allies in northern Europe.
Françoise Boucek’s book Factional Polit ics: How Dominant Parties Implode or Stabilize (Palgrave
Macmillan) is due out in November 2012.
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